



Volume V

Appendix G.3

CAIB Charter with Revisions

This Appendix contains the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001



February 2, 2003

Admiral Hal Gehman
3725 Lynnfield Drive
Williamsburg, VA

Dear Admiral Gehman:

This letter is to advise you that, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §2473 (c)(1), Section 203 (c)(1) of the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, as amended, and as a result of the loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia, I have formally activated the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. I am appointing you to be Chairman of this Board.

I am requesting your immediate and full cooperation with the investigation of the STS-107 Space Shuttle mishap of February 1, 2003. As Chairman of the Board, you are charged with all activities and responsibilities described in but not limited to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter.

Among other things, the Board shall independently determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle accident and recommend preventative or other appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar nature. Our regulations stipulate that the Board issue a final report within 60 days from this date. However, if you feel that you need additional time to arrive at a responsible conclusion, do not hesitate to request such additional time as you deem fit. You are free to pursue whatever avenue you deem appropriate. A copy of the Charter is attached for your reference.

I have designated Mr. David Lengyel and Mr. Steven Schmidt from my staff to be your key points of contact. We will also make other staff available to directly support the Board's activities.

I am grateful for your dedication and service to our country in this time of great need. I trust that you will be diligent, thorough, and unrelenting in your work to determine the cause and prevent the recurrence of this tragedy.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sean O'Keefe".
Sean O'Keefe
Administrator

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter

1. GUIDELINES

In the case of a high-visibility, mission-related Shuttle mishap, the NASA Administrator may activate an International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board (the Board). Board activation is anticipated for events involving serious injury or loss of life, significant public interest, and other serious mishaps. The Board should consist of at least seven members, and be supported by the Office of Space Flight Headquarters and technical consultants as required.

2. ACTIVATION

The recommendation for the NASA Administrator to activate this Board will normally be made at either the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight-directed Mishap Response Teleconference or as a decision at the Administrator's HCAT meeting and/or teleconference. For this case, the NASA Administrator has determined effective at 10:30 am February 1, 2003, to convene such a Board and to name it the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

3. MEMBERSHIP

Chairman of the Board
Admiral Hal Gehman, USN

Board Members

Commander, Naval Safety Center, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte
Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command,
Major General John Barry
Commander, HQ USAF Chief of Safety, Major General Kenneth W. Hess
Chief, Aviation Safety Division, Department of Transportation, Dr. James N. Hallock
Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Mr. Steven B. Wallace
Commander, 21st Space Wing, USAF, Brigadier General Duane Deal
Director, NASA Ames Research Center, Mr. Scott Hubbard

4. BOARD SUPPORT

Standing Board Support Personnel

Ex-Officio Member: Mr. Bryan O'Connor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance

Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer

Additional Support Personnel. The Board may designate consultants, experts, or other government or non-government individuals to support the Board as necessary.

Task Force Team Support. Within 72 hours of activation of the Interagency Board, the AA/OSF, the AA/SMA, the NASA Field Center Director or NASA Program Associate Administrator (Non-

OSF or Non Mission Related), and the NASA Chief Engineer will meet to elect and recommend non Task Force Team members to the Mishap Board Chairman. Upon approval by the NASA Administrator, the Task Force Team members will convene and meet with the appropriate Working Group Team leads. The Task Force Team will support the Board and they will:

1. Be the formal interface between the Board and the activated Working Groups;
2. Monitor, collect, document, and file the reports of the Working Groups activated to support the mishap investigation;
3. Provide the Board members with requested information and reports from the Working Groups; and
4. Assist the Board in the preparation of interim and final reports as required.


5. BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES

The Board will:

1. Conduct activities in accordance with direction from the NASA Administrator and the provisions of applicable NASA management instructions.
2. Work with the NASA Administrator to schedule Board activities, interim Board reports, and submission of the final Board report.
3. Determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap in terms of primary cause(s), and potential cause(s) and recommend preventive and other appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap. The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions of culpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action.
4. Use the established NASA support structure of working groups, NASA Field Center support, and supporting facilities to conduct the investigations. This includes staff advisors as required for expertise in areas such as public affairs, legal, medical, safety, and security.
5. Activate the working groups appropriate to the mishap.
6. Obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it considers relevant by relying upon reports of studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions by NASA officials and contractors or by conducting inquiries, hearings, tests, and other actions it deems appropriate. In so doing, it may take testimony and receive statements from witnesses. All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the Board and provide any records, data, and other administrative or technical support and services that may be requested.
7. Impound property, equipment, and records to the extent that it considers necessary.
8. Document findings in terms of (a) the primary causes of the mishap; (b) contributing causes; (c) potential causes; and (d) pertinent observations.
9. Release mishap information and mishap investigation reports in accordance with applicable NASA policies.
10. Develop recommendations for preventative and other appropriate actions. A finding may warrant one or more recommendations or may stand alone.
11. Provide a final written report to the NASA Administrator not later than 60 days.

February 1, 2003

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001



February 6, 2003

Admiral Hal Gehman
3725 Lynnfield Drive
Williamsburg, VA 23081

Dear Admiral Gehman:

Please find, attached to this letter, a revised Charter for the Columbia Accident Investigation Board. I am pleased to make the changes you requested, which are incorporated in this new text. I thank you for your efforts, and those of the entire Board, as we all dedicate ourselves to determining the cause of the accident.

Respectfully,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "Sean O'Keefe".

Sean O 'Keefe
Administrator

Enclosure

Columbia Accident Investigation Board Charter

1. GUIDELINES

In the case of a high-visibility, mission-related Shuttle mishap, the NASA Administrator may activate an International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board (the Board). Board activation is anticipated for events involving serious injury or loss of life, significant public interest, and other serious mishaps. The Board should consist of at least seven members, and be supported by the Office of Space Flight Headquarters and technical consultants as required.

2. ACTIVATION

The recommendation for the NASA Administrator to activate this Board will normally be made at either the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight-directed Mishap Response Teleconference or as a decision at the Administrator's HCAT meeting and/or teleconference. For this case, the NASA Administrator has determined effective at 10:30 am February 1, 2003, to convene such a Board and to name it the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

3. MEMBERSHIP

Chairman of the Board
Admiral Hal Gehman, USN

Board Members
Commander, Naval Safety Center, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte
Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command,
Maj. General John Barry
Commander, HQ USAF Chief of Safety, Major General Kenneth W. Hess
Chief, Aviation Safety Division, Department of Transportation, Dr. James N. Hallock
Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Mr. Steven B. Wallace
Commander, 21st Space Wing, USAF, Brig. General Duane Deal
Director, NASA Ames Research Center, Mr. Scott Hubbard

4. BOARD SUPPORT

Standing Board Support Personnel

Ex-Officio Member: Mr. Bryan O'Connor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance

Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer

Additional Support Personnel. The Board may designate consultants, experts, or other government or non-government individuals to support the Board as necessary.

Task Force Team Support. Within 72 hours of activation of the Interagency Board, the AA/OSF, the AA/SMA, the NASA Field Center Director or NASA Program Associate Administrator (Non-OSF or Non Mission Related), and the NASA Chief Engineer will meet to select and recommend

Task Force Team members to the Mishap Board Chairman. Upon approval by the NASA Administrator, the Task Force Team members will convene and meet with the appropriate Working Group Team leads. The Task Force Team will support the Board and they will:

1. Be the formal interface between the Board and the activated Working Groups;
2. Monitor, collect, document, and file the reports of the Working Groups activated to support the mishap investigation;
3. Provide the Board members with requested information and reports from the Working Groups; and
4. Assist the Board in the preparation of interim and final reports as required.

5. COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES


The Independent Board will:

1. Conduct activities in accordance with the provisions of applicable NASA policies and procedures.
2. Schedule Board activities, interim Board reports, and submission of the final Board report in coordination with the NASA Administrator.
3. Determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap in terms of dominant and contributing root causes and significant observations and, recommend preventive and other appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap. The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions of culpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action.
4. Use the established NASA support structure of working groups, NASA Field Center support, and supporting facilities to conduct the investigations. This includes staff advisors as required for expertise in areas such as public affairs, legal, medical, safety, and security.
5. Activate the working groups appropriate to the mishap.
6. Obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it considers relevant by relying upon reports of studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions by NASA officials and contractors or by conducting inquiries, hearings, tests, and other actions it deems appropriate. In so doing, it may take testimony and receive statements from witnesses. All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the Board and provide any records, data, and other administrative or technical support and services that may be requested.
7. Impound property, equipment, and records to the extent that it considers necessary.
8. Release mishap information and mishap investigation reports in accordance with applicable NASA policies.
9. Develop recommendations for preventative and other appropriate actions. A finding may warrant one or more recommendations or may stand alone.
10. Provide a final written report to the NASA Administrator not later than 60 days.

February 1, 2003

Revised: February 6, 2003

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
Office of the Administrator
Washington, DC 20546-0001



February 18, 2003

Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret)
Chairman
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
16850 Saturn Lane
Houston, Texas 77058

Dear Admiral Gehman,

Thank you for your comments on the charter changes proposed last week. Pursuant to your request, I have made further changes to the charter derived from our collective efforts to consult with Members of Congress. The enclosed charter reflects all revisions to this date.

The revised charter also reflects the appointments of Roger Tetrault and Sheila Widnall as members of the Board. You have advised that you are considering a recommendation to me for another appointment. In accord with our discussions, I am prepared to make such appointments you feel would contribute to the Board's work.

I am also in receipt of a copy of a letter addressed to you from NASA's Inspector General, Robert Cobb, on February 14, 2003, asking you to acknowledge your independence in certain respects. Please feel free to advise of any aspects of your charge you feel needs particular further emphasis. Of particular note relative to the Inspector General's views, you are charged in the charter to "obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it (the Board) considers relevant" to "determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap... and recommend preventative and other actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap."

These charter provisions and others clearly demonstrate that your Board can and must act independently. Your Board is entitled to receive any information that NASA has. If there is any resistance, please let me know and we will assure cooperation. It is within your charter to determine causes, including whether NASA budget or management or any other factors created an environment which caused or contributed to the cause of this accident.

Page 2
Admiral Gehman
February 18, 2003

For these and other factors we have discussed several times over the past two weeks, I find the Inspector General's views and advice to be completely consistent with our mutual understanding of the Board's responsibility and conduct of operations for this important investigation.

Cordially,



Sean O'Keefe
Administrator

**Columbia Accident Investigation Board
Charter**

1. GUIDELINES

In the case of a high-visibility, mission-related Shuttle mishap, the NASA Administrator may activate an International Space Station and Space Shuttle Mishap Interagency Investigation Board (the Board). Board activation is anticipated for events involving serious injury or loss of life, significant public interest, and other serious mishaps. The Board should consist of at least seven members, and be supported by the Office of Space Flight Headquarters and technical consultants as the Board deems appropriate.

2. ACTIVATION

The recommendation for the NASA Administrator to activate this Board will normally be made at either the Associate Administrator for the Office of Space Flight-directed Mishap Response Teleconference or as a decision at the Administrator's HCAT meeting and/or teleconference. For this case, the NASA Administrator has determined effective at 10:30 am February 1, 2003, to convene such a Board and to name it the Columbia Accident Investigation Board.

3. MEMBERSHIP

Chairman of the Board
Admiral Hal Gehman, USN (Ret)

Board Members

Commander, Naval Safety Center, Rear Admiral Stephen Turcotte
Director, Plans and Programs, Headquarters Air Force Materiel Command,
Maj. General John Barry
Commander, HQ USAF Chief of Safety, Major General Kenneth W. Hess
Chief, Aviation Safety Division, Department of Transportation, Dr. James N. Hallock
Director of Accident Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, Mr. Steven B. Wallace
Commander, 21st Space Wing, USAF, Brig. General Duane Deal
Director, NASA Ames Research Center, Mr. Scott Hubbard
Mr. Roger E. Tetrault
Dr. Sheila Widnall

4. BOARD SUPPORT

Standing Support Personnel Reporting to the Board

Ex-Officio Member: Mr. Bryan O'Connor, Associate Administrator for Safety and Mission Assurance

Executive Secretary: Mr. Theron Bradley, Jr., NASA Chief Engineer

Additional Support Personnel. The Board may designate consultants, experts, or other government or non-government individuals to support the Board as necessary. In addition, the Board may substitute non-NASA personnel as Executive Secretary at the discretion of the Chairman.

Task Force Team Support. Within 72 hours of activation of the Interagency Board, the AA/OSF, the AA/SMA, the NASA Field Center Director or NASA Program Associate Administrator (Non-OSF or Non Mission Related), and the NASA Chief Engineer will meet to select and recommend Task Force Team members to the Columbia Accident Investigation Board Chairman. Upon approval by the Board and appointment by the NASA Administrator, the Task Force Team members will convene and meet with the appropriate Working Group Team leads. The Task Force Team may to the extent that the Board deems appropriate:

1. Be the formal interface between the Board and the activated Working Groups;
2. Monitor, collect, document, and file the reports of the Working Groups activated to support the mishap investigation;
3. Provide the Board members with requested information and reports from the Working Groups; and
4. Assist the Board in the preparation of interim and final reports.

5. COLUMBIA ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD RESPONSIBILITIES

The Independent Board will:

1. Conduct activities in accordance with the policies and procedures adopted by the Board.
2. Schedule Board activities, interim Board reports, and submission of the final Board report as the Board deems appropriate.
3. Determine the facts, as well as the actual or probable causes of the Shuttle mishap in terms of dominant and contributing root causes and significant observations and, recommend preventive and other appropriate actions to preclude recurrence of a similar mishap. The investigation will not be conducted or used to determine questions of culpability, legal liability, or disciplinary action.
4. Use the established NASA support structure of working groups, NASA Field Center support, and supporting facilities to conduct the investigations, as the Board deems appropriate. The Board may use non NASA support as it deems appropriate.
5. Activate the working groups appropriate to the mishap.
6. Obtain and analyze whatever facts, evidence, and opinions it considers relevant by relying upon reports of studies, findings, recommendations, and other actions by NASA officials and contractors or by conducting inquiries, hearings, tests, and other actions it deems appropriate. In so doing, it may take testimony and receive statements from witnesses. All elements of NASA will cooperate fully with the

Board and provide any records, data, and other administrative or technical support and services that may be requested.

7. Impound property, equipment, and records to the extent that it considers necessary.
8. Release mishap information and mishap investigation reports, as the Board deems appropriate.
9. Develop recommendations for preventative and other appropriate actions. A finding may warrant one or more recommendations or may stand alone.
10. Provide a final written report at such time and in such manner as the Board deems appropriate which upon its completion will be immediately released to the public.

February 1, 2003

Revised: February 18, 2003

NewsRelease

National Aeronautics and
Space Administration

Washington, DC 20546
(202) 358-1600



Glenn Mahone/Bob Jacobs
Headquarters, Washington
(Phone: 202/358-1600)

For Release
Feb. 18, 2003

Steve Nesbitt
Columbia Accident Investigation Board
(Phone: 713/301-9571)

NOTE TO EDITORS: N03-019

SPACE SHUTTLE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD CHARTER AMENDED

The NASA charter for the independent panel in charge of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident investigation has been amended. The changes allow the Space Shuttle Accident Investigation Board additional flexibility in acquiring support staff and expertise outside of NASA.

NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe has indicated the charter will continue to be updated as necessary to ensure the panel, which is known as the Gehman Board, remains independent during the course of the investigation.

On Saturday, Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., announced the addition of Dr. Shelia Widnall of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Mass., to the panel. Dr. Widnall, former Secretary of the Air Force from 1993 to 1997, is a world-renowned expert in aircraft turbulence and spiraling airflows. She will begin meeting with the other members of the Gehman Board Thursday, Feb. 20, in Houston.

An updated copy of the board's charter and letter from the NASA Administrator is on the Internet at www.nasa.gov.

-end-